I am grateful to Washington University School of Law for hosting the recent discussion on my book Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly. I had three objectives in writing Liberty’s Refuge: one diagnostic, one historical, and one normative. The diagnosis highlights difficulties with the current doctrine of intimate and expressive association. The [...]
John Inazu’s impressive book, Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, interweaves two projects. First, it critiques the Supreme Court’s development of the freedom of association. Second, it makes the case for reviving the freedom of assembly in order to strengthen constitutional protection for the rights of groups, in particular, groups’ “right to exclude.” [...]
As a political culture seemingly hard-wired for the full-throated championing of individual rights, we are not quite sure what to do with liberty claims by groups. Whether we are talking about corporate speech rights, the treatment of religious student groups at public universities, the limits of the ministerial exception, the Boy Scouts’ [...]
Professor John Inazu’s recently published book, Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, is a truly impressive achievement. It is a good book for all of the usual reasons: it is well-researched, well-written, and persuasive. But Liberty’s Refuge is more than just well done—it is an important book in the contribution it makes to [...]
The opportunity to introduce this exchange about Professor John Inazu’s Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly confers a daunting privilege. Giving a decent account of someone else’s argument always makes for rough going, and the task becomes especially difficult when the argument features as much detail and nuance as Inazu has packed into [...]
This Article explains that what has been missing from the debate between advocates of popular constitutionalism and defenders of judicial supremacy is any account of the practice of constitutional interpretation. Without a clear sense of what constitutional interpretation involves, one cannot assess the prevailing assumption that the Supreme Court is uniquely positioned to interpret the [...]
