Archive for the 'Volume 89' Category



Liberty’s Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels?: The Limits of the Right of Assembly

Professor John Inazu’s recently published book, Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, is a truly impressive achievement. It is a good book for all of the usual reasons: it is well-researched, well-written, and persuasive. But Liberty’s Refuge is more than just well done—it is an important book in the contribution it makes to [...]

Categories: Articles, Current Article, In Print, Volume 89, Volume 89-6 | Posted: July 5, 2012


Entering Liberty’s Refuge (Some Assembly Required)

The opportunity to introduce this exchange about Professor John Inazu’s Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly confers a daunting privilege. Giving a decent account of someone else’s argument always makes for rough going, and the task becomes especially difficult when the argument features as much detail and nuance as Inazu has packed into [...]

Categories: Articles, Current Article, In Print, Volume 89, Volume 89-6 | Posted: July 5, 2012


Linking the Questions: Judicial Supremacy as a Matter of Constitutional Interpretation

This Article explains that what has been missing from the debate between advocates of popular constitutionalism and defenders of judicial supremacy is any account of the practice of constitutional interpretation. Without a clear sense of what constitutional interpretation involves, one cannot assess the prevailing assumption that the Supreme Court is uniquely positioned to interpret the [...]

Categories: Articles, Current Article, In Print, Volume 89, Volume 89-6 | Posted: July 5, 2012


Rebellious State Crimmigration Enforcement and the Foreign Affairs Power

The propriety of a new breed of state laws interfering in immigration enforcement is pending before the Supreme Court and the lower courts. These laws typically incorporate federal standards related to the criminalization of immigration (“crimmigration”), but diverge aggressively from federal enforcement policy. Enacting states argue that the legislation is merely a species of “cooperative [...]

Categories: Articles, Current Article, In Print, Volume 89, Volume 89-6 | Posted: July 5, 2012


Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea

Patent law defines novelty by the creation of a new embodiment, not an idea. For example, the Wright brothers are deemed to have invented the airplane because nobody made an airplane before, not because they were the first to think of flying.
Patent law then defines monopoly scope through a theory of disclosure of embodiments: despite [...]

Categories: Articles, Current Article, In Print, Volume 89, Volume 89-6 | Posted: July 5, 2012


Vol. 89:5


Categories: In Print, In Print - Table of Contents, Volume 89, Volume 89-5, Volumes | Posted: July 5, 2012